National policies - Greece

Administrative policy

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

The object and goals of administrative policy are mandated by two general constitutional objectives:

Effective administration of the state (art. 101)
Democratic legitimisation of public administration structures at all levels (art. 102)

Policy actors and instruments have been constantly shifting following administrative reforms in 1974, 1986, 1994, 1997, and 2010 following successive (re)formulations of the competences of the branches of public administration, as well as their geographical scope. Administrative reforms are also associated with the evolution of EU structural funds management and the also continuous shifting of those (parallel) structures.

Policy procedures and instruments generally vary (and shift) according to sectoral policy. Horizontal instruments may be institutional (e.g. Statute of Internal Services, Code of Municipalities, licensing procedures) or financial (e.g. national, regional, prefectural, municipal budgets, EU regional aid). Planning instruments are mainly associated with national, regional or sectoral programming documents associated with EU agricultural/structural funds distribution. It is important to note that, despite devolution in competence since the 1990s, the central government has tried to maintain control over both public revenue and spending, resulting in chronic financial dependency of local, prefectural and regional governments. In addition, the small size of local governments as well as the bureaucracy of regional funds has led to a general underperformance of local authorities in mobilizing funds, despite their general availability.

While the division of powers between levels of self-government has been clearly defined, the same has not been the case between elected and appointed authorities at the regional level. This has been a constant source of friction within regions.

Since the 1980s, civil service evaluation, inspection and control mechanisms have been extremely weak. This has often led to underperformance and corruption which, coupled with political favoritism and clientelism, has led to institutional weakness of self-government at all levels. Despite legal and institutional provisions, overall performance of the civil sector by general admission is quite low. Much has been written with regard to the lack of incentives, the general practical impunity of civil sector employees, and political interference (especially with regard to environmental law). Whatever the cause, administrative change, training, and capacity building is generally slow. The civil service (both local and central) has more often been used and regulated as an instrument of political power, rather than as a means of providing effective public services.

With regard to the first level of self-government (OTA, the local level), municipality (city) and community (rural) jurisdiction limits had remained virtually unchanged since the early 1900s. Administrative reorganization took place in 1997 with grouping of several first level OTA and reducing their number from several thousand to 1034, a change that affected primarily rural communities. Further reform and mergers in 2010 reduced the number of municipalities to 325. The scale of the reform is well exemplified through local government in the study areas. The Messara Valley first level local governments were reduced from 56 to 9 in 1997 and then to 4 in 2010. Asteroussia Mountains first level local governments were reduced from 14 to 5 in 1997 and then to 4 in 2010.

Spatial planning policy

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

Implementation

Spatial planning policy has suffered from weaknesses both in policy formulation at the national level and in implementation. On the one hand, the Greek constitution and several laws have attempted to institute land use and spatial planning regulations and, on the other, the economic growth imperative and weak administrative structures have undermined most attempts to organise economic activity in space.

Goals of spatial planning policy

Goals of Spatial Planning Policy
(L. 2742/1999 on Spatial Planning and Sust. Development)

Goals of Urban Planning Policy
(Law 2508/1997 on Sust. Urban Development)

Protect and restore the environment, preserve the ecological and cultural reserves, and enhance and promote the comparative geographic, natural, productive, and cultural advantages of the country.
Strengthen the continuous and balanced economic and social development of the country and its competitive presence in its broader European, Mediterranean, and Balkan context.
Support social and economic cohesion, particularly in regions face development disparities, intense social differentiation, and environmental degradation as well as other regions facing disparities due to their geographical position.
In 2010, a fourth renewable source objective was added: protect the climate and atmosphere and promote the country’s energy independence through the use of renewable energy sources.

Gradual emergence and organization of “open cities” in non-urban space, the enhancement of cohesion, and the rehabilitation of urban and peri-urban space.
Securing urban and town planning incorporates settlement parameters, environmental protection, and restraints on unregulated building, through the introduction of development criteria which contribute to minimum settlement expansion.
Environmental renewal, particularly in degraded areas through safeguarding social and technical infrastructure, and control of land-use according to suitability criteria and standards.
The protection, promotion, and environmental improvement of city centers, cultural towns, and traditional cores of settlements, parks, and other elements of natural, archaeological, historical, and cultural environment of cities settlements and peri-urban space.

In addition, urban planning must be compatible with the protection of the natural and cultural environment, the principles of planning science, and general development goals, including the safeguarding of productive farmland.

Formal actors implementing spatial planning policy at the study site level are local spatial planning offices and the Regional Directorate for the Environment and Planning.

Local spatial planning until 2010 was the competence of the Heraklion prefectural government that oversaw three branch offices in Heraklion, Moires and Kastelli, of which the last two cover the study site in its entirety. The main function of these offices has been the issuing of building permits, with few long- term planning initiatives at the local or prefectural level.

Although the 1997 and 1999 administrative and legislative reforms gave new impetus to spatial planning at the regional level, the preparation of the regional plans was carried out centrally by the Department of Planning of the Ministry for Environment, Planning and Public Works (reformed in 2009 as the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change, YPEKA).

Policy recipients are, by definition, either formal or informal actors in spatial planning policy. Recipients include private individuals and investors (companies or individuals). The role of consultants, mainly (civil) engineers, in preparing dossiers for building permits is particularly strong. A variety of organised interests and lobbies is also active in spatial planning although the centralised nature of spatial planning policy.

The (national) General Framework for Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development (2008) provides general spatial planning guidance documents for the whole country. Its provisions with regard to Crete and the study site in particular include:

A recognition of a north/south polarization with regard to growth in Crete, with the northern coast being far more developed and the central/southern parts (including the study site) lagging behind and exhibiting a dependence on the urban centers in the north.
A recognition of Messara as prime agricultural land under threat by scattered building activity throughout its territory.
The General Framework generally downplays the role of agriculture as a national priority and concentrates instead on transport, energy and telecommunications.

The Regional Framework for Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development (2003) characterises the study site as "an area with significant natural and cultural capital".

At the national level, the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change (YPEKA) also prepares Special Frameworks for Spatial Planning and Sustainable Development that concern sectors of the economy. Of particular relevance to the study site are Special Frameworks for Renewable Energy Sources (2008) and Tourism (2009). These regulatory instruments are clearly growth-driven and contain provisions which might have dramatic impacts upon land use. Essentially they permit the simultaneous development of tourism and renewables throughout, with the exception of designated archaeological areas and NATURA2000 sites under presidential protection of which there are none in the study site.

The General, Sectoral, and Regional Frameworks provide general guidance, which then has to be ‘translated’ into detailed spatial planning directions through appropriate General Town Plan (GPS) and Plan of Spatial Organisation for and Settlements and Open Cities (SHOOAP). However, only a small fraction of the territory of the study site is covered by such plans (Moires, 1997; Tympaki, 2010; Zaros, 2012). In the rest of the study sites, no spatial or land-use plans have been or are being prepared or implemented. A result of the lack of planning is the proliferation of productive units and to some extent housing and photovoltaic installations throughout prime agricultural land.

In addition to the above, during interviews at the study site, the respondents attributed the weaknesses of the regional and local spatial planning implementation to the following factors:

lack of political will to undertake and enforce spatial planning;
lack of coordination between sectoral policies and (horizontal) spatial planning, exemplified in the conflicting and maximalist provisions included in different Special Frameworks and also in poor communication between relevant department;
in the absence of spatial planning at the lower level, and with weak administrative structures, licensing is done on an ad-hoc basis and generally interpreting the regional framework as non-binding.

Impacts

Specific spatial planning policy instruments have had little impact, as they have been poorly implemented or not implemented at all. Where frameworks exist, impacts are hard to analyse due to conflicting provisions, primarily between the regional framework of Crete (and to some extent the general national framework) and the renewable energy framework. The former designates Messara as primarily agricultural land while the latter opens up all agricultural land to renewable energy development. However, while solar energy installations (photovoltaic cells) are replacing olive groves, it would be far-fetched to attribute this to the Renewables Spatial Planning framework. On the contrary, it seems reflect other government policies and decisions, such as investment incentives and high feed-in tariffs, as well as prevalent market forces. In this context, one may also note the absence of a spatial sectoral framework for agriculture, as the sector has not gained the same priority at the national political scene.

The impact of non-implementation is obvious in other cases:

Pre-2003 lack of GSP/SHOAAP plans resulted in dispersal of building activity in agricultural and coastal space, that produced a general sprawl along the main roads and the coastal zone.
Post-2003 lack of GSP/SHOAAP plans reflect reluctance to observe the regional guidelines, with regard to prime agricultural land. In the absence of the latter, the previous laissez faire situation continues, driven by market forces. While pre-2008 tourism had been the main force, it has since been replaced by solar energy projects.
Lack of implementation of the main instruments available (listing of settlements, land characterisation as productive) reinforces the dynamic for land-use change from farming to residential, tourism, and to some extent, industrial development.

Effectiveness

While the study sites do retain much of their natural beauty (goal 1), this is not necessarily attributable to the law: where commercial pressure does exist, for example along the coast, development proceeds irrespective of other considerations. The lack of effectiveness in this respect is facilitated by conflicting provisions at different levels of planning as well as the general reluctance to adopt land-use regulation at the municipal level. Although Greece, Crete, and Messara have grown rapidly during the last 30 years (goal 2), it is debatable whether this dynamic has been "strengthened" by provisions of spatial planning policy. In fact, general non-implementation of the policy objectives would point to a dissociation between growth and formal spatial planning instruments.

The effectiveness of the policy has also been extremely limited, or non-existent, particularly with regard to "restraining unregulated building" or "control of land-use". Overall, the policies have been quite effective in achieving "covert" goals, such as continuation of non-planning. In a general framework of weak administrative structures, the policy remains practically non-enforced.

Regional development policy (including tourism)

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

Implementation

Regional policy has been the dominant development policy in Greece since the mid-1980s when the country accessed the EU.

Regional policy objectives and procedures are set out in the European and national documents and legal instruments, clearly delimiting the process of implementation. The primary formal implementer of regional policy is the Intermediate Managing Authority of the Region of Crete (IMA Crete). Calls for proposals and project selection are supervised and ultimately effective only after approval by a politically appointed General Secretary (since 2010 the elected Head of the Region). Approval for larger projects may rest on the Ministry of Development or the European Commission and their competent bodies, respectively. Management Authorities and Intermediate Management Authorities of Sectoral OPs (based in Athens) may ultimately implement programmes and projects of a much larger scale and influence than those of the ROP. IMAs are assisted by Monitoring Committees. Other local agencies may function as management authorities and/or beneficiaries of Operational Programmes include ANK (Company for the Support and Development of Cretan Businesses, owned and managed by the Chambers of Commerce, the regional Pancretan Cooperative Bank and the University of Crete) and the Heraklion Development Agency S.A. (HDA, local development agency originally functioning as a Local Action Group for the implementation of the LEADER initiatives) and OANAK (Organisation for the Development of Eastern Crete). Municipalities and prefectures have acquired administrative capacity to become more active in co-financed projects, primarily related to infrastructure (road construction).

The Regional Government (department of investment) processes applications for grants for small-scale private investments. Applications for medium- and large-investments are processed centrally by the relevant departments of the Ministry of Development. Thresholds for the size of investments are generally in flux.

Local Members of the Parliament and other political (party) networks play a significant although informal role in regional policy implementation, functioning as lobbyists in Athens for public or private projects.

Policy instruments affecting and/or implemented in the study sites are primarily financial and include the Regional Operational Programme of Crete, various Sectoral Operational Programmes (SOPs) and the investment law. The sum of Structural Funds spending for the Region of Crete for the 2000-2006 Programming period was €2,285,209,472, out of which €911,905,039 was managed through the ROP.

It is important to note that, at over €1 billion, SF expenditure in the Heraklion Regional Unit alone exceeded the total budget of ROP Crete (€911 million) by more than 10%. This is explained by the function of the city of Heraklion as a regional capital (population, transport the service economy), the presence of the University of Crete and several research centres, the implementation of integrated urban projects and the designation of Heraklion as an Olympic city.

Road works maintain the lion’s share of expenditure (27.9%), followed by SME support (24.3%), employment (12.1%), education and healthcare (11.9%), heritage (9.9%), and R&D and other business services (5.4%).

Total Structural Funds Spending in the Region of Crete, 2000-2006

Prefecture (Regional Unit)	Budget For Prefecture (Regional Unit) (Public And Private Expenditure) in €
Heraklion	1,064,830,964
Chania	477,698,642
Rethymnon	406,121,835
Lasithi	336,558,031
TOTAL CRETE REGION (including ROP)	2,285,209,472
ROP	911,905,039

Source: Authors

For the 2000-2006 period, the ROP-Crete managed over €760 million.

Specifying exact amounts directed to the study sites is far from straightforward. For example, as indicated above, data for private investments support is not available for the municipal level.

Municipality fragmentation, reduced institutional capacity and perverse financial incentives lead to the absence of large-scale and long-term projects from the ROP. Local political strategies tend to depend on short-term results as well as severe competition between municipalities for access to funds. These characteristics lead to a regional equilibrium where the construction of many small roads and the support for many small private investments predominates.

Impacts

At the very least, Structural Funds represent a large cash infusion into the Greek economy, and they have all but replaced the public investment programme. The contribution to physical infrastructure (roads, ICT, schools, universities) has been significant and it is clearly visible in Crete and Heraklion. Attempts to improve environmental infrastructure, such as sewage and waste management, which have had significant positive impacts elsewhere, have been marginal in the study site.

It is difficult to draw conclusions about the study sites: spending is concentrated in the city of Heraklion and the northern axis of Crete and has largely remained outside the study site. The main institutions, contractors and other beneficiaries of regional aid are based in the regional capital. While spill over effects are undoubtedly present, their extent has not been measured.

Institutionally, however, structural funds have engendered several dynamics:

they have dominated public discourse and politics at all levels. Structural funds' financial incentives have overshadowed, or even hampered, the implementation of other policies such as horizontal environmental and water policy;
they have diverted attention from organisational and institutional deficiencies;
they have provided opportunity for corruption, for both politicians and civil servants;
"hard" physical infrastructure has had adverse impacts on fragile environments, road construction in particular;
they have introduced new models of project management and competition, facilitating a gradual reform of the public administration. Old actors adapting to these process as well as newly established actors, have gained both prominence and acceptance at the local and regional level.

Effectiveness

Formal regional development goals and objectives are set at the EU level and the effectiveness of the policy is generally best judged at that level.

The contribution of EU Structural Funds to the development (growth) of Messara and the country as whole during the last 20 years is beyond dispute. The country has received unprecedented cash infusions, fuelling investment in public works as well as private enterprises, mainly in the tourism sector. Although in Crete much of this investment has been concentrated in the city of Heraklion, spill over effects undoubtedly exist. In addition, funds directed to Messara are far from negligible and far exceed investment in the area during the previous decades. Investment in the Asteroussia study site has been limited.

With regard to "structural adjustment" however, results can be seen as more mixed. While investment in communications, energy, and transport infrastructure may be seen to contribute in this respect, the underlying productive structures remain largely the same. In Messara, tourism and agriculture persist as the main pillars of the economy with their structural characteristics (small scale family operations) largely unchanged. One could further argue that these characteristics have been solidified through regional policy, which has distributed financial support for small scale businesses (mainly in the tourism sector) through primarily political affiliation criteria.

Indeed, the policy may be seen as especially effective in achieving political hegemony at the national, regional, and local level. This political hegemony has been achieved through fund allocation, contracts for public works, and informal networks for access to investment support at the national, regional and study site level.

Agricultural/rural (development) policy

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

Implementation

Agricultural and rural development is a primarily European policy, designed at the EU level. Implementation of the policy remains largely in the hands of the Ministry of Rural Development and Food (formerly of Agriculture). Local implementation is therefore severely constrained and concerns mainly procedural instruments related to fund administration.

At the study site level, most of the weight of implementation of Pillar I instruments has traditionally been vested with the Department of Agriculture of the Prefecture of Heraklion. which was the regional branch of the Ministry of Agriculture but is now under the elected regional government. Until 1980 (pre-CAP) the Department had a strong technical assistance and programming role in agricultural policy matters. Since 1980, when Greece accessed the EU and the CAP was introduced, the Department assumes the role of intermediary between national authorities and local farmers in the emerging system of subsidy distribution, with its programming role gradually weakened.

CAP reforms led to the institution of OPEKEPE (Payment and Control Agency for EAGF and EARDF). It is directly overseen by the Ministry of Agriculture and operates a local chapter in Heraklion.

Farmer cooperatives have had a formal role in agricultural policy. More than 30 first level cooperatives are active in Messara but, due to their small size and membership they are relatively weak. Unions of cooperatives are significantly more important. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, unions of cooperatives retained a formal role in subsidy distribution. The dual role of cooperatives and their unions as both policy implementers and policy recipients has come under severe criticism and led to widespread disenchantment. When considering cooperatives, it is important to distinguish between "old" and "new" cooperatives. The former, originated in the 1930s, and their close ties with the political system since the 1980s have meant that they have been less market-oriented than many of their members would prefer. This attitude is present among the members of the cooperatives of study communities of Protoria and Gagales that have been interviewed. On the other hand, a new wave of cooperatives, aided by rural development funding, has emerged since the late 1990s, taking the form of producer groups. Although they are not powerful actors in policy implementation, they have dynamism and much clearer contract relationships with their members, devoid of any unionism characteristics.

The main agricultural policy instruments include the Single Area Payment /Single Farm Payment scheme, rural development measures and the Code of Good Agricultural Practice as an instrument of cross- compliance. National policy instruments include, the National Land Cadastre (non-implementation with far-reaching implications).

Assessment of rural policy implementation is constrained by lack of data in the field, particularly with regard to the period from 1980 to 2000. Direct subsidy data remains largely outside the public domain, particularly with regard to smaller geographical units (e.g., municipality). With regard to rural development measures (post 2000), data collection and availability is significantly improved but it is concentrated on the NUTS III level and not the municipality level. In addition, it is further complicated by shifts in fund management: for example from 2000 to 2006 data is "lumped" with regional funds spending.

As a result, analysis has focused on qualitative issues emerging from interviews conducted by LEDDRA researchers in the study site. The main points with regard to implementation of the subsidies in the 1980s and 1990s include the following.

Direct subsidies have been instrumental in increasing agricultural income and improving living standards of farmers and their families.
As a general rule, only a fraction of direct subsidies contributed to investment in agricultural holdings in the 1980s and 1990s. While this is in line with the policy's stated objectives (at the EU level), it has to some extent prevented the restructuring and/or modernisation of the agricultural sector.
Direct subsidies have supported the economy of Heraklion as a whole rather than the agricultural sector of Messara or Asteroussia. Eligibility for subsidies has included thousands of individual land-holders and legal persons (e.g. the church), living outside Messara. This has evolved into a source of considerable friction with farmers and locals. The ability of "outsiders" to obtain income support has also functioned against restructuring through market forces, such as land consolidation.

The introduction of the Single Area Payment/Single Farm Payment since the early 2000s has to increased the pressure on full-time farmers to modernise and, in particular, to seek agricultural income outside the various price guarantee support schemes. This tendency is exemplified by the rapid expansion of intensive greenhouse farming in Messara and, in particular, around the southwest town of Tympaki.

In 2009 decoupled direct subsidies in Crete amounted to €293 million and they were directed to almost 137,000 beneficiaries. As a result, Crete ranks third among the thirteen Greek regions according to subsidies received (13.7% of a total 2.14 billion) and first according to the number of beneficiaries (16.7% of 822,000 beneficiaries). It ranks fourth, however, with regard to the net value of agricultural production (€396 million) and second to last with regard to the ratio of net value over total value (including subsidies): at 57% this ratio is below the national average (62%). Bearing in mind that Messara includes a significant part of market-driven, export oriented farmers occupied in vegetable farming, it becomes clear that the structural problems identified above, as far as Messara is concerned, relate primarily to the production of olives and olive oil.

Rural development instruments have also been primarily financial, originating in the first LEADER Community initiative in 1989. Heraklion was one of the first areas of Greece where a local action group was formed, becoming a testing ground of the local partnership model which constituted a major institutional innovation for the country. This partnership resulted in the formal establishment of the Heraklion Development Agency in 1989 which, along with the Ministry of Agriculture, has been the main implementer of rural development policy in the Messara study site. HDA's first shareholders were 4 communities of northern Herkalion and, through subsequent public offerings, it has expanded to include all municipalities and several agricultural cooperatives

Data availability of EARDF funding improves since 2000 but it is hampered by the lumping together of projects receiving funding under different sources at the regional level. Nevertheless, an exposition of processed data allows one to draw general conclusions with regard to implementation in the region of Crete.

During the period 2000-2006, agricultural infrastructures, including the Faneromeni reservoir within the boundaries of the Messara study site, captured the lion's share of EARDF spending (over €78 million), followed by other infrastructure (roads, settlements etc. over €37 million) and investments in agricultural holdings (almost €17 million). Therefore, rural development policy seems to replicate tendencies already present in regional development policy:

The construction of large works presents an equilibrium between policy users and implementers. On the other hand, auxiliary activities and measures for operation are often non-implemented (irrigation networks, water management plans).
Both the "integrated interventions" and "infrastructure for areas lagging behind" categories (totalling almost €50 million) include large parts of road and building construction. Again, these sums are directed to a bloated public works sector without direct relevance to the agricultural economy.
"Investments in agricultural holdings" have been an important source of support for farmers but not to shepherds (Asteroussia study site)
"Agri-environmental measures", have constituted only a minor spending category in the region (€2.6 million). This is largely due to lack of familiarity of formal implementers (Ministry of Agriculture and prefectural Departments of Agriculture) as well as of policy recipients (consultants, farmers) with the nature of the interventions.
The dominant spending categories are processing and marketing (almost €48 million), water works (€42 million), investments in agricultural holdings (almost €34 million), alternative investments (e.g. tourism; €31 million) and young farmers (€17 million).
The absence of agri-environmental measures is almost complete.
Despite the above, the agricultural profession seems to remain relatively attractive for the prefecture of Heraklion with several thousand farmers entering the profession or modernising. The bulk of relevant spending was directed to Messara and a large portion of funding was ultimately directed to greenhouse expansion.
By comparison, collective efforts by farmers are generally absent from Heraklion and Messara. Support for setting up producer group measures has been extremely limited, not due to lack of funds but rather due to lack of demand.

EARDF 2000-2006 in Heraklion (excluding roads and settlements)

Measure	Geographical frame of reference	Measure budget (euro)	Budget in Heraklion prefecture (euro)	% of measure spent in Heraklion
Processing/ marketing*	Greece	1,201,454,494	47,805,972	4%
Water management / Land improvement	Heraklion	42,001,507	42,001,507	100%
Investment in agricultural holdings*	Crete	95,030,634	33,773,985	36%
Alternative investments in rural areas	Crete	170,206,781	30,905,708	18%
Young farmers *	Crete	39,757,189	17,394,227	44%
Reconstitution of damaged capacity	Greece	76,003,371	7,939,882	10%
Certification/ marketing of quality products	Greece	37,195,311	3,302,082	9%
Rural area support mechanisms	Heraklion	3,185,468	3,043,189	96%
Forestry	Heraklion	1,057,968	1,057,968	100%
Rural electrification	Heraklion	648,794	648,794	100%
Husbandry	Greece	4,080,775	230,382	6%
Producer groups*	Heraklion	14,288,588	114,607	1%
Product safety	Heraklion	59,826	59,826	100%
TOTAL		1,684,970,706	188,278,129

*Includes commitments made in previous programming period

Source: www.ops.gr, accessed November 12th 2012; processed by the authors

A series of public and private stakeholders (individuals, cooperatives, municipal official) point to a complete absence of inspections, controls and penalties at the farm level. Dossiers and applications are processed in offices in Heraklion and Athens but verification of action taken is extremely limited (cross-compliance requirements with regard to the environment, soil and water).

Agricultural and rural development policy implementation intersects with spatial planning policy and water policy.

Impacts

The most important impact of agricultural policy has been the support of farmers throughout the study site by providing generous income support for agricultural incomes. As a result, it has contributed to the raising of the standard of living as well as the broader regional economy.

A major unforeseen impact of the policy has been the establishment of powerful policy actors at the national, regional and local levels. Their function as intermediaries for subsidy distribution has served at the same time to solidify their position but also to create widespread disillusionment of farmers. This dominant (rentier) position has maximised their political influence as well as a general stagnation vis-a-vis Pillar II reforms and rural development in general.

In the study site, these actors (politicians, cooperatives and the public administration) have also been reluctant to follow CAP reforms, and have actively prevented the implementation of agri-environmental components of rural development policy since 2000. The limited examples of collective action and agri-business development, despite the existence of a critical mass of farmers, are such a case.

In this context, farmers (Messara) and shepherds (Asteroussia) have been unable to capitalise on traditional farming practices: while the EU has focused on extensification and lower input and impact agriculture, the sector in Messara has undergone drastic intensification, fuelled by financial support for new investment primarily greenhouses.

At the individual holding level, lack of professional training and education coupled with ample finance has led to unsustainable growth. Farmers have modernised and relied more on inputs (fertilisers, seeds, pesticides), largely due the availability of cash. However, as primary resources (soil and water) dwindle and the prices of supplies rise, individual farmers are extremely exposed and may lack survival options.

Nevertheless, the separation of the impacts this policy from other trade and economic policies is almost impossible. Farmers have benefited from the first stage of EEC integration through falling supply and machinery prices, credit availability as well as a broader market for agricultural products. On the other hand, since 2000, they have been particularly exposed to global trade and price fluctuations, which are impossible to deal with at the level of the small Messara holding.

The small level of holdings has also been a decisive factor in preventing policy implementation of other policies requiring coordination and management, most notably water policy.

Effectiveness

Price support and subsidies have contributed to the achievement of all CAP objectives since the 1980s when they were first implemented. Standards of living have generally risen, markets have been stable and agricultural products have generally reached consumers without problems.

The CAP contributed to increasing agricultural productivity through dramatic increases in inputs (machinery, fertilizers etc.) to which substantial sums of subsidies were directed. However, productivity is also partially the result of specialisation advocated by national policies in the 1970s. These changes were in turn finalised through the subsidy system.

CAP reforms since 2000 have widened and replaced the policy's objectives.

In Messara, the introduction of rural development policy has contributed to the competitiveness objective through the introduction of support for new investment, particularly greenhouses, which now dominate production and local revenue around the Tympaki area. On the other hand, broader restructuring and collective efforts have been limited. Little modernisation has taken place in the Asteroussia study site through rural development instruments.

The second objective to be implemented through agri-environmental measures has largely eluded the area. The construction of the Faneromeni dam may be seen to contribute in that direction, however, as the dam was only recently completed its contribution to improving the environment remains to be seen. In fact, one could argue that the environment objective has been directly undermined by the first objective, by fuelling water use, high-input agricultural, and the proliferation of agricultural waste (plastic), particularly in the Messara study site.

The policy has been more effective with regard to the third objective by providing support for local businesses (arts and crafts, bed and breakfasts) and municipalities.

The decoupling reform has led to significant reductions in farmers' income and undermined stability. This process has been augmented by the reluctance of the administration and key actors (cooperatives) to prepare for the reform. Overall, the general stance of denial and aggressive support for "business as usual" left the sector exposed at the lower level (individual farmers and olive grove owners). Although, the policy may be seen as effective with regard to greenhouse horticultural produce which has a strong dynamic, the olive sector in Messara and stockbreeding in Asteroussia have been particularly hit by the reform

The sustainability objectives (rural development, health check) remain largely elusive.

Horizontal environmental policy

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

Implementation

During the 1990s and early 2000s, the principal formal actor for the implementation of horizontal environmental policy was the Heraklion Prefectural Department for the Natural Environment. Since 2010, the department has been incorporated into the structure of the regional administration, effectively becoming the Department for the Natural Environment of the Heraklion Regional Unit.

Application for a license to the Prefectural Department has had to include the opinions of several other services, primarily the Heraklion Forest Service, the Heraklion Prefectural Department of Industry (for mechanical installations) and the Department of Spatial Planning regarding compliance with land-use regulations.

For projects above a certain size, EIAs have to be submitted to higher levels of government, usually the central ministries. In case of rejection, applicants may resort to higher levels of government (Head of the Prefecture, Minister of Public Works, Planning and the Environment (replaced/renamed since 2009)).

These administrative units have been changing throughout the last 30 years, creating a general uncertainty with regard to competences and appropriate levels of government for intervention.

An additional role for environmental licensing rests with the General Directorate for Environment and Planning (GDPSE), which has been under the General Secretary of the Region and is now under the General Secretary of the devolved-authority. Based in Heraklion, the GDPSE is the general environmental licensing authority for most public works including roads and other transport infrastructure, waste and wastewater management facilities.

Private investors and businesses are, by definition, formal actors in the horizontal environmental policy. Investment, and therefore applications requiring EIAs for new industrial installations in the study sites, has been minimal during the last 30 years. In the Messara Valley, the prevalent installations concern small scale agri-businesses, primarily olive mills and presses and, to some extent, hotels along the coastline. In the absence of other spatial planning requirements with regard to resources of the area, the main issue for both categories of installations is the question of wastewater receptors for sewage (hotels, olive mills).

The character of the policy is such that all actors have clear formal roles. However, during the licensing or inspection procedure informal networks are activated either for and applicant of against a rival.

The main instruments of horizontal environmental policy are the approval of environmental terms of operation and more recently, the Strategic Environmental Assessment.

With regard to approval of environmental terms for private projects, administrative procedures have been in place since 1986, although their effectiveness is hard to assess. Major hotels in the Matala Area (Messara Study Site) do have wastewater treatment facilities. No major individual sources of pollution are present in the area.

With regard to enforcement of environmental terms of operation for private operators there is no significant evidence although anecdotal accounts point to a general lack of inspections and controls.

The implementation of environmental licensing tends to focus on procedural requirements set out in the relevant EU legislation. With regard to the content of environmental impact assessment studies (part of applications) and the content of subsequent decisions on Environmental Terms of Operation, conclusions are hard to draw. However, local tensions with regard to resources point to weaknesses: for example, water shortages during the summer season indicate that both residential and tourism development have put severe strain on the local environment, not anticipated during environmental licensing procedures.

The same conclusion may be drawn with regard to environmental controls and inspections. Although periodic inspections are foreseen in the legal framework, inspections tend to take place only after the filing of formal complaints. All interviews point to a general reluctance on the part of the public to use formal complaints as a means to mobilise the administration. There have been no penalties or fines for private operators in the study area for environmental infringements during the last 5 years.

With regard to public works, approval of environmental terms is related to general project approval, covering the construction of works such as roads, waste and wastewater treatment facilities as well as dams. As project finance (EU co-financing) is dependent upon compliance with EU legislation, procedures tend to be closely followed, often speeded up by widespread public approval and demand for those projects. In this case, political pressure for approval may prevail over technical and other considerations.

Implementation of horizontal environmental policy brings to the forefront issues which go to the heart of the land degradation problem in Messara. Firstly, the largest projects and investment tend to be carried out by public authorities whose incentives (fund absorption, works visibility) may go against the policy objectives. In this case, different branches of government may collude to achieve a “development” objective. Secondly, compliance with and enforcement of policy provisions is hampered by the practice described above as well as the tendency to ignore “minor” infringements on social or political grounds. Thirdly, the two elements above breed a culture of “non-compliance” which becomes pervasive. As a result, land degradation in the study area becomes a policy co-ordination problem: the aggregate impacts of small-scale operations (water wells, olive processing, small tourism infrastructure) has visible effects over time, affecting all citizens and natural resources. The situation is exacerbated by the reluctance of public authorities to undertake coordination initiatives or actively undermine implementation in the case of their own projects. All of the above contribute to the chronic weakness of the implementation mechanisms.

The use of Strategic Environmental Assessment process as an instrument has also been limited. SEAs were first implemented during the preparation of the Operational Programmes of the National Strategic Reference Framework (NSRF) 2007 -2013, as part of the approval process by the European Commission. With regard to the ROP Crete-Aegean Islands, the SEA study clearly identifies potential problems and deems the ROP to generally have negative environmental impacts (biodiversity loss, land degradation and land-use change, water resources depletion, landscape degradation and degradation of the cultural environment, impacts on sustainable resource management). Road construction is identified as the principal environmental threat of the programme, but continues to be the dominant activity receiving regional aid. Other mitigation measures such as water conservation measures, integration of biodiversity and landscape conservation criteria in project selection are totally absent. Interim evaluation and progress reports with regard to the environment have not been prepared.

Impacts

In the absence of an overall framework for the management of major resources (land, water, biodiversity) and in the presence of weak civil service, there is no frame of reference within which to assess environmental impacts of projects and programmes. Licensing therefore acquires a bureaucratic character, with limited examination of specific environmental issues. In addition, horizontal environmental policy has only recently begun to be implemented in earnest and its impacts may not yet be visible. Although the policy has served to bring some environmental issues to the foreground, it has ultimately failed to resist powerful market forces. These forces include the following:

Small scale developments, such as housing and small scale tourism infrastructure, generally falling under the threshold for environmental impact assessment. Nevertheless, the number of those developments in the 1990's rose to the thousands and their aggregate impacts (wastewater, waste, energy) is significant.
Water wells operated by individuals, businesses, municipalities or local irrigation organisations (TOEB). Again, although the majority of such installations falls outside the scope of the requirement for submission of an environmental impact assessment, their aggregate result upon the aquifer does have considerable impact. In addition, users tend to exceed the quantities for which they have been granted license. On this front, enforcement and penalties are hampered by a weak administration and political complacency.
Olive mills, the main source of pollution in the area, operate within a framework similar to the above and are also aided by the fact that they are the destination of much of the study site's produce. They are generally required to have water treatment installations, although water quality inspections and fines are rare.

The policy has therefore had limited impacts upon the Messara Valley SES.

Effectiveness

With regard to the main objective, i.e. "adoption of fundamental rules and the establishment of criteria and mechanisms for environmental protection", the policy has been particularly effective. Since 1986, a variety of rules, mechanisms, and agencies have developed around environmental licensing. However, the policy is geared towards control of (large scale) installations and activities, of which very few exist in the study sites.

The policy has been partially effective with regard to the control of wastewater from olive mills and hotels, and practically non-implemented with regard to abattoirs. Enforcement of the policy after licensing has been particularly weak. Licensing of small-scale activities (construction, groundwater extraction, urban wastewater, waste management) has particularly hampered the effectiveness of the policy: licensing applications are received individually without any framework to assess their collective impacts.

The policy has been applied extensively to public works. In this field, accounts point to the dominance of the development (and EU fund absorption) undermining environmental considerations. No challenges on environmental grounds were brought forward to extensive road works in the area or the Faneromeni dam.

SEA implementation has focused on procedures rather than content. For example, while the Regional Operational Programme of Crete was accompanied by a SEA pointing in particular to the dangers of road construction upon soil erosion, roads continue to be the main source of spending for the ROP.

Water policy

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

Implementation

Historically, the main national actors with regard to water policy have been the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Development. Their role in general policy design has been limited. The Crete Regional Water Directorate has been assigned with regional water management and monitoring since 1987. Although throughout Greece, Regional Water Directorates have been seen as generally underperforming and limited their role to the issuing of water use and water works licenses, the Crete Regional Directorate has been particularly extrovert in its attempt to tackle broader water management issues through particular measures as well as through its participation in international projects.

The recent transposition of the EU Water Framework Directive foresees the formation of a Regional Water Committee (consultation body) which has not yet been activated in Crete.

The various Agricultural Departments (prefectural) of Crete have carried out a large number of studies for irrigation and water storage works which have to a very large extent dominated water policy in the island. Since the 1990s these works have been constructed by the Public Works Directorate of the Region of Crete.

Since the late-2000s, the National Special Secretariat for Water has been extremely active in the preparation of water management plans on behalf of the regions. Nevertheless, in the case of Crete the process has been stalled and no draft plan is in consultation as is the case in the rest of the country. This is attributed to internal bureaucratic reasons within the Ministry of Environment.

Locally, urban water provision and pricing is regulated by the municipalities or companies under municipal control (Municipal Water and Sewage Companies-DEYA). Two DEYAs operate in the study sites (Messara only) in the Municipality Minoa-Pediados and the Municipality of Phaestos. Municipalities operate wells and water distribution networks, as well as sewage facilities, where they exist.

Municipalities also oversee the operation of TOEBs (Local Organisation of Land Improvement). TOEBs manage and price local irrigation water on behalf of farmers, with the latter’s participation. Messara includes 4 TOEs based in Moires, Tympaki, Pompia, and Ini.
A large number of private wells exist in the area, both legally and illegally. In this case, the user, generally either a farmer or a hotelier, may enter into an unofficial arrangement to sell water (e.g. to neighbours).

Informal actors in water policy are local engineers, contractors, and politicians lobbying for public works. Their influence partly explains the dominance of water works on the public agenda as opposed to water management schemes. The Region of Crete has seen the construction of several dams and reservoirs during the last 20 years, driven by the availability of Structural Funds financing.

While most actors tend to be formal, their relationship may assume informal characteristics. For example, along the Messara coast, significant tension exists between farmers and locals, particularly during the summer months, when demand is high for tourism and irrigation. Given that the law and subsequent municipal council decisions prioritise the provision of potable water, farmers may resort to water theft from the public water network.

Pricing for water is another case where informal relationships may come into play. In the first instance, prices may be set at low levels to ease political pressure upon municipal officials. Furthermore, bill and fine payments may become the object of clientelist relationships with officials turning the other way towards widespread non-payment.

The main water policy instruments implemented at the Messara study site are water monitoring programmes, the water use and water works license, reservoir construction and restrictive measures. Instruments not implemented include a water management plans (either local or regional) with regulatory status and nitrate pollution prevention.

Several water monitoring networks have been in place in the Region of Crete since the 1980s, providing adequate information with regard to water quality and quantity. The Water Directorate has been extremely proactive in attempting to regulate water use, including the preparation of a regional water management plan in the late 1990s. Although this draft plan is one of the few prepared in the country, it was never formally adopted by the regional government. At the moment, Crete in now the only region without a regional water plan.
Two decisions have been issued by the Regional Secretary bannning new groundwater drilling installations in large parts of the island and extensive parts of the Messara valley, covering approximately 43% of its area. It has to be noted however that the Tympaki area, where pressure is most intense, remains outside the scope of the restriction decision.

The exact number of wells in the area remains unknown, despite two countrywide attempts at a census of water (use) rights. In 2010, all water use license holders were required to re-register their licenses or they would lose them. At the time of writing, this process was still in progress.

With regard to implementation, it must also be noted that there is no established procedure for the verification of actual use by each license holder. Reports of overuse abound.

Several reservoirs serve the Messara study site and several more are planned for construction. Reservoir construction has taken place since the 1990s, driven by the availability of EU structural funds.

Water pricing is implemented by TOEBs or Municipalities albeit not without problems. Average water price in Messara is currently at €0.18 /m³, well below TOEBs or municipalities management costs or cost recovery thresholds, with irrigation being financed by public municipal resources. This is confirmed by interviews with municipal civil servants. Despite the construction of the large Faneromeni reservoir, management and pricing continues to take place at the municipal department level without any overall management structure.

With regard to nitrates, Messara is not on the List of Vulnerable Zones and no special water pollution prevention and control programmes are in place, despite extensive application of nitrogen fertilizers. With regard to industrial wastewater, water policy implementation is streamlined through the relevant provisions of horizontal environmental policy. Upper limits of water to be used in irrigation exist both in national laws and in regional regulations presented above. Nevertheless, checks and controls on the ground are virtually non-existent. Where transgressions are noted by fellow farmers they tend to be dealt with in an informal fashion primarily through recourse to political and family networks. Fines and other sanctions for water use and pollution are also non-existent.

Impacts

Water use instruments (licenses) have overshadowed management instruments (planning, coordination, pricing, conservation). The latter are completely absent in the study sites. Water scarcity in Messara and elsewhere may be seen as direct impact of the partial implementation of policy instruments in the period after 1987, also coupled with other formal policies (environmental licensing) and agriculture. Water extraction has also been driven by funding availability, most of it originating from EU sources (agricultural holdings, hotels, municipalities).

Despite calls for control from scientists and the civil service, political willingness to accept any sort of local regulation on water use has been remarkable, but understandable: tourism and agriculture are the main sources of income for the study site. Limits upon water use could possibly affect product quality for both sectors. However, the region's decision to prohibit all new wells in most parts of Messara is indicative of the gravity of the situation and the problems of the lack of coordination. Implementation at the lower level faces the same problems, with considerable reluctance to engage in management and conservation.

Effectiveness

The formal process for obtaining water use licensing (1987), "democratised" water use by generally making groundwater extraction available to all. This has certainly been the case in Messara. On the other hand, management plans for the country and the regions, although formally foreseen, were never prepared.

Law 3199/2003 clearly includes "the protection and management of inland surface waters and groundwater" as its central goal and points also to the general objectives of the EU Water Framework Directive (provision of sufficient supply of good quality water, significant reduction in pollution, protection of territorial and marine waters etc.)

The lack of policy effectiveness is generally evident, most notably in aquifer depletion in the summer months and subsequent water conflicts being characteristics of the current water situation.

Nitrate pollution policy remains non-implemented in Messara, as there has been a central political decision to exclude olive groves from consideration for inclusion in the sensitive areas list. The policy has been non-effective with regard to its stated goal of "protect[ing] of waters against pollution caused by nitrates from agricultural sources". Such sources abound in Messara whether in olive grove management or horticultural production along the coastal plain.

Nature protection (biodiversity) policy

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

The main formal actor in biodiversity policy has been the Heraklion General Directorate of Forests. Prior to 1996 the General Directorate was supervised by the (centralised) Forest Service and since then by the General Secretary of the Region. The General Directorate has been beneficiary and project manager for two LIFE projects implemented in the Asteroussia mountains. As project manager the Forest Service collaborated with the Museum of Natural History of Heraklion, EKBY (Hellenic Centre for Biotopes/Wetland Centre) as well as local independent scientists.

Law 1650/1986 foresees the creation of participative management bodies for protected areas, through presidential decree prepared by the Ministry of Environment. No such management body exists in Asteroussia or Messara. This lack is the result of bottom-up pressure (i.e. from local actors towards the Ministry of Environment) and from lack of top-down enforcement of the birds and habitat directives by the Greek government. As a result, biodiversity protection is implemented through horizontal environmental policy rendering the relevant licensing authorities (the prefectural/regional Department of Environment) the most important formal actor. Although biodiversity protection is an area of priority for EU regional aid, the Crete OP had not financed any related projects until 2011. Nevertheless, provisions were included in the 2007-2013 OP rendering the regional management authority a non-active policy actor.

The permanent local population of livestock breeders are the main informal actor in biodiversity policy. Local perception of the NATURA2000 network has tended to be negative, if not hostile. One of the main species under protection, the bearded vulture (Gypaetus barbatus), has traditionally been perceived as a threat to local free grazing flocks and cases of poisoning of were common until the late 1990s. Although local government (municipalities) are not formally involved in the policy they adopted a “quiet” attitude favouring non-implementation of habitat management and protection measures, reflecting the general attitude of the population. Environmental groups (from Messara and Heraklion) are also active in the area and much work has been carried out with regard to awareness-raising.

A most important factor in shifting attitudes towards biodiversity policy in general has been the perceived threat of renewable energy deployment in the area, primarily wind turbines. The scale of projects which have received licenses involve large-scale land-use change drastically affecting the Asteroussia rangelands. The informal actors described above have been extremely active in organising opposition to such project development. In this context, biodiversity policy and mobilisation of the relevant instruments and actors are seen as a way to safeguard traditional activities and cancel proposed developments, on the basis of the threat they pose to bearded vulture.

The main biodiversity policy instrument is the inclusion of Asteroussia in the NATURA2000 network in its current form, as both a Special Protection Area (birds) and a site of community importance (habitats). The main species under protection are the bearded vulture, the local palm tree (Phoenix theofrastii) and the loggerhead sea turtle (Caretta caretta), rendering the largest part of the study site an important wildlife habitat .

Policy implementation in the study site suffers from chronic inabilities of the public administration to integrate biodiversity legislation and wider concerns in the policy process. EU financing through the LIFE Programme found its way to the area via the mediation of EKBY and the Forest Service, implementing two multi-annual scientific projects. The projects included monitoring of the status of the vulture and its habitat, the study and proposal of management measures and also small scale infrastructure to improve feeding of the bird and accessibility by visitors (mountain paths etc.). The projects focused on scientific management of the site with the aim of conservation, while proposing a variety of social and economic measures and wider projects. Proposed management measures are comprehensive and directly recognize free grazing as the main activity within the habitat and tackle the complex connections between the vulture’s population and grazing in the area. Part of the project included extensive rangeland management proposals.

However, further integration of proposed policy measures, has remained elusive since the completion of the projects. Formal policy instruments such as biodiversity monitoring, the issuing of a presidential decree specifying land-uses, activities and management and protection measures remain unimplemented. In this case, while scientific information and proposals for management measures have been prepared and are well in the public sphere, the lack of a presidential decree (formal institutional instrument) and designation of a management body (formal actor) signifies a general non-implementation of biodiversity policy at the local level. Poor policy implementation means that direct biodiversity policy impacts and effectiveness are extremely difficult to establish. Nevertheless, unofficial accounts point to a significant drop in poaching and poisoning of the bearded vulture as well as an increase in its population.

Forest policy

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

The object of forest policy is the conservation, development, and improvement of forests and forest land (other wooded land). Forests and forest land are constitutionally defined as national capital and the exercise of any private right, deemed to be against general protection clauses, may only be instituted by law. At the heart of the legal and institutional framework is the broad and inclusive definition of forests covering Mediterranean maquis.

The overall goal of forest policy is the “conservation and improvement of the natural environment of the country”. This fairly clear-cut objective is complemented by further, often conflicting, objectives:

To set out specific protection measures for the conservation, development and improvement of forests and forest lands.
To define the terms and preconditions under which forest and forest land-use may be modified or made to serve other uses, for reasons imposed by the national interest.

In the absence of spatial planning at the regional or national level, prior to 2000, forest policy instruments have de facto served as spatial planning instruments.

The main actors in forest policy are primarily state agencies, as 80% of forests and forest lands are state property. “Traditional” actors in forest policy are forest workers and cooperatives, the wood-based industries, and forest dependent rural communities (mainly in mountainous regions), whose size and influence is declining steadily. Other forest owners, including the Church and municipalities also form part of forest policy.

The General Directorates for Forests (local forest services) of the devolved authorities are responsible for forest policy implementation on the ground, local forest management and wood-production, issuing of administrative acts etc. It is important to note that at local forest services can be seen as having policy formulation powers: forest management plans, where they exist, are legally binding. In devolved forest directorates and their sub-divisions have wide investigative and policing powers.

As a result of the lack of cadastre and planning, a large influence on forest policy is exerted by state agencies and several organized groups and interests seeking to modify land-uses or to influence the terms of use/lease of public forest land.

Policy instruments & procedures include forest management plans and licenses (logging, resin extraction, herb collection, grazing etc). Furthermore, in the absence of a formal administrative land-classification schemes and cadastre, one of the main instruments of forest policy has been the forest designation act: at the request of a third party (public or private), the local forest service issues an act specifying whether the land is forest or not.

For forest land, the forest service may issue an approval of operations. This approval is based on the list of permissible operations (derogations) in Law 998 and its amendments.

Financing for forest policy has taken place through the Central Fund for Agriculture and Forests of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Green Fund of the Ministry of Environment, while EU rural development funds are a complementary source of investment.

With regard to the study sites (Asteroussia, Messara) the policy is characterised by non-implementation: private fears of having land designated as a forest (leading to potential difficulties in land-use change and/or development) has led to the general tendency of removing woody species/wild shrub. Indicative of the general mistrust between local populations and the forest services is the fact that attempts at aforestation by public authorities have been generally sabotaged by local grazers (cutting fences, diverting irrigations, letting animals graze on saplings).

Soil policy

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

In Greece, the main legal basis and instrument regarding soil protection is the UNCDD as ratified by Law 2469/1997. Soil quality is also a key component/theme in other EU and national policies, most notably agricultural and environmental policy (landfill of waste and industrial pollution prevention). The objective of the UNCDD (Law 2469/1997) is “to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought in countries experiencing serious drought and/or desertification, … in the framework of an integrated approach … with a view to contributing to the achievement of sustainable development in affected areas”. (article 2 UNCDD). “Long-term integrated strategies” are identified as the main instrument to achieve the objective. The Ministry of Rural Development and Food (formerly Ministry of Agriculture) is by law responsible for the implementation of the UNCDD, through the joint participation of the Directorate of Land Reclamation and Agricultural Structures and the General Directorate for the Development and Protection of Forests. A Greek National Committee to Combat Desertification (GNCDD) was established in 1996 as a scientific advisory body (Min.Dec 96990/9361). The GNCDD's National Plan to Combat Desertification foresees that Prefectural Committees to Combat Desertification should established to formulate, coordinate, and implement local plans. No such Committees have been established.

To date the main policy instrument directly addressing soil issues is the National Action Plan to Combat Desertification (NAP), prepared by the GNCCD and adopted by Ministerial Decision in 2001. The measures foreseen in the Plan are broad and extensive. Several of those are being implemented through other policies with no concrete reference to desertification. In addition (as shown in other policy articles), two central policies which could directly address and prevent the desertification problem, water policy and land-use planning, have failed to yet engage in the cross-cutting issues.

The NAP identifies the Asteroussia Mts as an area at extremely high risk of desertification and singles the site for the implementation of pilot projects and measures, none of which however have been implemented.

Landscape policy

2012-09-06T05:15:56+00:00

Authors:	Eleni Briassoulis, Alexandros Kandelapas
Coordinating authors:	Constantinos Kosmas, Ruta Landgrebe, Sandra Nauman
Editors:	Alexandros Kandelapas, Jane Brandt

{xtypo_alert}Editor's note 3Jul14: Sources D142-3 and D242-4.{/xtypo_alert}

Landscape was recently introduced in the Greek legal framework in the framework of the ratification of the European Landscape Convention (ELC – the Florence Convention) whose object concerns landscapes that might be considered outstanding as well as everyday or degraded landscapes, whether they be natural, rural, urban or peri-urban, land, inland water, and marine. Several aspects of the policy have been present in older policies, such as planning, zoning, and related licensing as well as nature protection. Cultural aspects of the landscape have historically been a major consideration in licensing processes through the active participation of the Archaeological Services (Ministry of Culture).

The general aim of the ELC (Law 3827/2010) is to promote landscape protection, management, and planning, and to organize European co-operation on landscape issues.

The Ministry of Environment, Energy and Climate Change is responsible for the formulation and coordination of landscape policy. A ten-member Landscape Committee, comprising of academics, civil society and high-level civil servants (from directorates of Planning, Environmental Design, and Forests) is the main advisory body to the Ministry, with the main task of policy formulation. The Directorate of Planning (of the same Ministry) is the administrative division with overall responsibility for landscape policy.

The main policy instruments foreseen in the ELC are awareness-raising for the wider public, multidisciplinary training and education, identification and assessment of landscapes in the country’s territory, definition of landscape quality objectives and the introduction of instruments to protect, manage and/or plan the landscape.

The Directorate for Planning is currently in the process of drafting a Proposal for a 5-year National Landscape Strategy and Landscape Action Plan, five legislative proposals for the implementation of the above and of preparing a typology of Greek landscapes and guidelines for sustainable landscape management according to type, a permanent system for information dissemination and public consultation encompassing web GIS applications and pilot studies for selected areas. The project includes the ex-post review of all Regional Frameworks Planning and Sustainable Development, the main instruments for land-use planning.